Critical reasoning (CR) when confronted with contradictory information from multiple sources is a crucial ability in a knowledge-based society and digital world. Using information without critically reflecting on the content and its quality may lead to the acceptance of information based on unwarranted claims. Previous personal beliefs are assumed to play a decisive role when it comes to critically differentiating between assertions and claims and warranted knowledge and facts. The role of generic epistemic beliefs on critical stance and attitude in (...) reflectively dealing with information is well researched. Relatively few studies have been conducted on the influence of domain-specific beliefs, i.e. beliefs in relation to specific content encountered in a piece of information or task, on the reasoning process, and on how these beliefs may affect the information-processing and decision-making processes. This study focuses on students’ task- and topic-related beliefs that may influence their reasoning when dealing with multiple and partly contradictory sources of information. To validly assess CR among university students, we used a newly developed computer-based performance assessment in which the students were confronted with an authentic task which contains theoretically defined psychological stimuli for measuring CR. To investigate the particular role of task- and topic-related beliefs on CR, a purposeful sample of 30 university students took part in a performance assessment and then were interviewed immediately afterwards. In the semi-structured cognitive interviews, the participants’ task-related beliefs were assessed. Based on qualitative analyses of the interview transcripts, three distinct profiles of decision-making among students have been identified. More specifically, the different types of students’ beliefs and attitudes derived from the cognitive interview data suggest their influence on information processing, reasoning approaches and decision-making. The results indicated that the students’ beliefs had an influence on their selection, critical evaluation and use of information as well as on their reasoning processes and final decisions. (shrink)

Aristotle axiomatically divides the 28 syllogisms of necessity of Anal, prior. I 9-11 into two classes: those with a necessary conclusion and those with a non-necessary conclusion. The fact that Aristotle axiomatically comprehends only 24 syllogisms of necessity, however, raises two questions: 1. What method does he use to decide about the remaining four syllogisms? 2. Is this method consistent with the initial one? This essay pursues the answers to these questions first by means of semantic analysis, showing that Aristotle (...) ultimately considers assertoric propositions to be possible and therewith non-necessary propositions. Aristotle employs this approach, developed within the axiomatic, to the four syllogisms in question, thereby integrating them into the axiomatic. Finally, this essay answers the question of consistency by way of a formalization of the syllogisms of necessity. (shrink)

Aristotle axiomatically divides the 28 syllogisms of necessity of Anal, prior. I 9-11 into two classes: those with a necessary conclusion and those with a non-necessary conclusion. The fact that Aristotle axiomatically comprehends only 24 syllogisms of necessity, however, raises two questions: 1. What method does he use to decide about the remaining four syllogisms? 2. Is this method consistent with the initial one? This essay pursues the answers to these questions first by means of semantic analysis, showing that Aristotle (...) ultimately considers assertoric propositions to be possible and therewith non-necessary propositions. Aristotle employs this approach, developed within the axiomatic, to the four syllogisms in question, thereby integrating them into the axiomatic. Finally, this essay answers the question of consistency by way of a formalization of the syllogisms of necessity. (shrink)

This study gives an arithmetic calculus to determine tautologies, contradictions and satisfiable formulas of the first order logic. The presented calculus may easily be extended on modal and deontic logic. The mathematical foundation of this arithmetic calculus is a Boolean ring.

Summary This study continues in calculating formulas of the first order logic. Whereas the preceding part delt with monadic predicates, the present part treats polyadic predicates. The presumptions were supplied analogously.

The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle's modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle's assertoric syllogistics uniformly , that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the (...) assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires . Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence . He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences. In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or - equivalently - from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. The two last named axioms are sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions. (shrink)

On the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, (...) it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or – equivalently – from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions. (shrink)

Much of the focus of programs designed to promote responsible conduct in research has traditionally been on the high crimes of fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. We believe that equally deserving of our attention are the misdemeanors that also can occur. Viewed as individual events, these “little murders” are far less serious. Yet, we believe that in the aggregate they can do great harm, not the least because they can set the stage for far greater crimes.

Although conflated in the public mind, science and technology are separate though overlapping enterprises. While technological progress is advancing rapidly, the more philosophically oriented scientific fields are experiencing an epistemological crisis. In the following text, we examine the origins of this epistemological crisis. Although the crisis is multifactorial in origin, with the factors interacting in a nonlinear fashion, several distinct contributors can be identified. These include a decline in confidence in Western culture and a concomitant rise in exaggerated self-criticism, diminution (...) of cause-and-effect relationships, the rise of relative truth, and a transition from an agnostic to an atheistic stance among scientists. (shrink)